受貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義影響,中歐貿(mào)易糾紛將持續(xù)。歐盟放棄“市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)地位”和“非市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)地位”概念轉(zhuǎn)而使用“經(jīng)濟(jì)扭曲”概念,就是為了保留對(duì)華反傾銷(xiāo)調(diào)查的法律基礎(chǔ)。歐盟一旦認(rèn)定中國(guó)存在市場(chǎng)“嚴(yán)重扭曲”,就可以使用第三國(guó)的價(jià)格來(lái)判定是否存在傾銷(xiāo)行為。歐盟反傾銷(xiāo)調(diào)查新方法相比過(guò)去沒(méi)有實(shí)質(zhì)變化,只是將適用條件從“非市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)國(guó)家”變成了“嚴(yán)重扭曲市場(chǎng)”。在這一原則指導(dǎo)下,現(xiàn)有的反傾銷(xiāo)武器依然有效,歐盟對(duì)華反傾銷(xiāo)調(diào)查的數(shù)量不會(huì)減少,根據(jù)實(shí)際利益需要,在具體領(lǐng)域的“雙反”力度或?qū)⒓哟蟆?/div>
但從中長(zhǎng)期看,情況未必十分悲觀。歐洲國(guó)家仍有較強(qiáng)的動(dòng)力吸引外部投資,分享新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體的發(fā)展機(jī)遇。隨著“一帶一路”項(xiàng)目在歐洲投資漸多,中國(guó)企業(yè)更加熟悉當(dāng)?shù)貭I(yíng)商環(huán)境,承擔(dān)起更多社會(huì)責(zé)任并積極解決就業(yè)問(wèn)題,歐洲民眾對(duì)“一帶一路”的感知會(huì)發(fā)生相應(yīng)變化,對(duì)該倡議的建設(shè)性意義會(huì)有更加客觀的認(rèn)識(shí)。因此,未來(lái)歐盟在細(xì)化安全投資審查機(jī)制規(guī)定和規(guī)范的同時(shí),也會(huì)尋求市場(chǎng)保護(hù)與開(kāi)放之間的平衡。正如歐洲智庫(kù)所分析的,以國(guó)家安全為借口搞市場(chǎng)保護(hù)并不能持久。歐盟作為自由市場(chǎng)的先驅(qū),必須秉承真正的開(kāi)放原則,避免一些保護(hù)措施加劇歐盟市場(chǎng)的脆弱性。公平的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境對(duì)維持歐盟產(chǎn)品長(zhǎng)期競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力和維護(hù)國(guó)際貿(mào)易多邊體系非常重要。歐盟勢(shì)必會(huì)在自由貿(mào)易原則和保護(hù)關(guān)鍵部門(mén)之間做好平衡,以避免被外界誤讀為對(duì)中國(guó)搞市場(chǎng)保護(hù)是一種反華行為。(33)
從歐洲對(duì)“一帶一路”倡議的政策看,中歐之間的競(jìng)合關(guān)系是常態(tài)。雙方對(duì)五通領(lǐng)域(政策溝通、道路聯(lián)通、貿(mào)易暢通、貨幣流通和民心相通)合作的規(guī)則、執(zhí)行方式、彼此收益等方面的認(rèn)識(shí)仍存在差異和分歧,爭(zhēng)奪互聯(lián)互通領(lǐng)域規(guī)則話語(yǔ)權(quán)等競(jìng)爭(zhēng)仍將在一定范圍內(nèi)存在。與此同時(shí),中歐之間在五通領(lǐng)域仍有加強(qiáng)合作的意愿和訴求,也有更大的合作潛力和動(dòng)力。
客觀地看,歐洲所倡導(dǎo)的互聯(lián)互通與“一帶一路”既具備基本理念上的共識(shí),也具備合作對(duì)接的現(xiàn)實(shí)基礎(chǔ)。從中長(zhǎng)期來(lái)看,合作而非對(duì)抗符合雙方的共同利益。歐盟通過(guò)互聯(lián)互通來(lái)推進(jìn)共同大市場(chǎng)建設(shè)和一體化經(jīng)驗(yàn)可以為“一帶一路”倡議所借鑒,“一帶一路”倡議實(shí)施五年來(lái)已構(gòu)建國(guó)內(nèi)和亞歐大陸合作網(wǎng)絡(luò),取得了豐富成果,也積累了豐富經(jīng)驗(yàn),有助于歐亞互聯(lián)互通的落地實(shí)施。中歐雙方的互聯(lián)互通倡議均旨在促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)要素有序自由流動(dòng)、資源高效配置和市場(chǎng)深度融合。中歐雙方可以將此理念上升為共識(shí)并加以推廣。在互聯(lián)互通的執(zhí)行方式上,“共商、共建、共享”的中國(guó)方式和“基于規(guī)則、可持續(xù)性”的歐洲方式可以在沿線不同國(guó)家因地制宜,求同存異。
注釋?zhuān)?/div>
?、贇W洲一些民粹主義政黨只是“疑歐”,但并不意味著反歐盟,只是對(duì)歐盟持懷疑主義立場(chǎng),或是批評(píng)歐元區(qū),或是反對(duì)歐盟的緊縮政策。
?、?Populism and Protectionism in the EU," June 29,2017,https://www.aspeninstitutece.org/news-article/populism-protectionism-european-union/.(上網(wǎng)時(shí)間:2018年6月20日)
③胡澤曦:“搞保護(hù)主義‘小聰明’要不得”,人民網(wǎng),2017年2月24日,http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0224/c40531-29104761.html。(上網(wǎng)時(shí)間:2018年6月20日)
?、躂eroen van der Waal and Willem de Koster,"Populism and Support for Protectionism:The Relevance of Opposition to Trade Openness for Leftist and Rightist Populist Voting in the Netherlands," November 10,2017,https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage.(上網(wǎng)時(shí)間:2018年6月20日)
?、軵aul DiMaggio,John Evans and Bethany Bryson,"Have American's Social Attitudes Become More Polarized?," American Journal of Sociology,Vol.102,Issue 3,1996; Alan I.Abramowitz and Kyle L.Saunders,“Is Polarization a Myth?,” The Journal of Politics,March 2008.
⑥Parlgov數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)對(duì)各黨派的意識(shí)形態(tài)傾向(左還是右進(jìn)行數(shù)據(jù)量化劃分)用0—10分作為量表,數(shù)值越小表示越左,數(shù)值越大表示越右。詳見(jiàn)http://www.parlgov.org。(上網(wǎng)時(shí)間:2018年6月20日)
?、遊美]貝弗里·西爾弗著:《勞工的力量——1870年以來(lái)的工人運(yùn)動(dòng)與全球化》,張璐譯,社會(huì)科學(xué)文獻(xiàn)出版社,2012年,第28頁(yè)。
?、嗍分練J、劉力達(dá):“民族主義、政治危機(jī)與選民分野——2014年歐洲議會(huì)選舉中極右翼政黨的崛起”,《當(dāng)代世界與社會(huì)主義》2015年第2期,第113-123頁(yè)。
⑨詳細(xì)數(shù)據(jù)統(tǒng)計(jì)參見(jiàn):http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00028&plugin=1。(上網(wǎng)時(shí)間:2018年6月20日)
?、庥嘘P(guān)中位年齡的詳細(xì)數(shù)據(jù)參見(jiàn):http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=demo_pjanind&lang=en。(上網(wǎng)時(shí)間:2018年6月20日)
(11)Richard Jackson,“The Challenge of Global Aging,” Global Aging Institute,February 2015,https://www.globalaginginstitute.org/assets/client-assets/common/downloads/video/Challengeof-Global-Aging-HD.mp4.(上網(wǎng)時(shí)間:2018年6月20日)
(12)Steer Davies Gleave,“Research for TRAN Committee:The New Silk Route-Opportunities and Challenges for EU Transport,” European Commission,January 2018,https://research4committees.blog/2018/01/16/the-new-silk-route-opportunities-and-challenges-for-eu-transport/.(上網(wǎng)時(shí)間:2018年6月20日)
(13)Shaun Breslin,“Global Reordering and China's Rise:Adoption,Adaptation and Reform,” The International Spectator,Italian Institute of International Affairs,March 2018.
(14)Christian Ploberger,“One Belt,One Road-China's New Grand Strategy,” Journal of Chinese Economics and Business Studies,Vol.15,2017.
(15)“China Undermining Us ‘with Sticks and Carrots':Outgoing German Minister,” The Age,February 19,2018,https://www.theage.com.au/world/europe/china-undermining-us-with-sticks-and carrots-outgoing-german-minister-20180219-p4z0s6.html.(上網(wǎng)時(shí)間:2018年6月20日)
(16)John Hurley,Scott Morris and Gailyn Portelance,“Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective,” CGD Policy Paper 121,March 4,2018,https://www.cgdev.org/publication/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.(上網(wǎng)時(shí)間:2018年6月20日)
(17)Mathieu ,“Trump Trade Reset Gives China and Europe Opportunity to Rebalance Relations,” ECFR,March 16,2017,www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_trump_trade_reset_gives_china_and_europe_opportunity_7246; Thilo Hanemann and Mikko Huotari,“Record Flows and Growing Imbalances-Chinese Investment in Europe in 2016,” Rhodium Group and Mercator Institute for China Studies,January 2017,http://rhg.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/RHG_Merics_COFDI_EU_2016.pdf; Gisela Grieger,“Foreign Direct Investment Screening:A Debate in Light of China-EU FDI Flows,” European Parliamentary Research Service,May 2017,http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/603941/EPRS_BRI(2017)603941_EN.pdf.(上網(wǎng)時(shí)間:2018年6月20日)
(18)Ronald H.Linden,“The Open Door Swings Back:The Challenge of Chinese Investment,” The International Spectator,Italian Institute of International Affairs,March 2018.
(19)Jost Wubbeke,Mirjam Meissner and Max J.Zenglein,“Made in China 2025:The Making of a High-tech Superpower and Consequences for Industrial Countries,” Mercator Institute for China Studies,December 2,2016,https://www.merics.org/en/papers-on-china/made-china-2025.(上網(wǎng)時(shí)間:2018年6月20日)
(20)Jonathan Holslag,“How China's New Silk Road Threatens European Trade,” The International Spectator,Vol.52,2017,pp.46-60.
(21)Mathieu and Alexandre Sheldon Duplaix,“Blue China:Navigating the Maritime Silk Road to Europe,” European Council on Foreign Relations,April 2018,http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/blue_china_navigating_the maritime silk road to europe.(上網(wǎng)時(shí)間:2018年6月20日)
(22)“New German Regulation on Foreign Investment Control,” King & Wood Mallesons,July 14,2017,https://www.chinalawinsight.com/2017/07/articles/global-network/new-german-regulationon-foreign-investment-control/.(上網(wǎng)時(shí)間:2018年6月20日)
(23)European Commission,“State of the Union 2017-Trade Package:European Commission Proposes Framework for Screening of Foreign Direct Investments,” September 2017,http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3183_en.(上網(wǎng)時(shí)間:2018年6月20日)
(24)Ivana Karaskova et al.,“Central Europe for Sale:the Politics of China's Influence,” Association for International Affairs,April 2018,http://www.chinfluence.eu/central-europe-for-sale-the-politicsof-chinas-influence-2/.(上網(wǎng)時(shí)間:2018年6月20日)
(25)European Commission,“Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People's Republic of China for the Purposes of Trade Defense Investigations,” December 20,2017,https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/other/SWD-2017-483-F2-EN-0-0.PDF.(上網(wǎng)時(shí)間:2018年6月20日)
(26)Thilo Hanemann and Mikko Huotari,“EU-China FDI:Working towards More Reciprocity in Investment Relations,” New Research by MERICS and Rhodium Group,April 17,2018,https://www.merics.org/en/papers-on-china/eu-china-fdi-working-towards-more-reciprocity-investmentrelations.(上網(wǎng)時(shí)間:2018年6月20日)
(27)European Parliament,“The Western Balkan's Berlin Process:A New Impulse for Regional Cooperation,” July 4,2016,http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2016)586602.(上網(wǎng)時(shí)間:2018年6月20日)
(28)“A Credible Enlargement Perspective for and Enhanced EU Engagement with the Western Balkans,” Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,the Council,the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,February 6,2018,https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-credible-enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf.(上網(wǎng)時(shí)間:2018年6月20日)
(29)劉作奎:《歐洲與“一帶一路”倡議:回應(yīng)與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)》,中國(guó)社會(huì)科學(xué)出版社,2017年,第11-12頁(yè)。
(30)“EU Backs Away from Trade Statement in Blow to China's Modern Silk Road Plan,” The Guardian,May 15,2017,https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/15/eu-china-summit-bejingxi-jinping-belt-and-road.(上網(wǎng)時(shí)間:2018年6月20日)
(31)“May Resists Pressure to Endorse China's ‘New Silk Road’ Project,” Financial Times,January 31,2018,https://www.ft.com/content/3e79ae14-0681-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5.(上網(wǎng)時(shí)間:2018年6月20日)
(32)“Foreign Investment Screening and the China Factor:New Protectionism or New European Standards?,” Rasmussen Global,November 16,2017,https://thewonk.eu/reports/foreign-investment-screening-and-the-china-factor_r3115.html.(上網(wǎng)時(shí)間:2018年8月10日)
(33)“Foreign Investment Screening and the China Factor:New Protectionism or New European Standards?”.