While Syria has reinvigorated talk of “climate migrants” and Tuvaluans’ claims to asylum in New Zealand have increased the visibility of “climate refugees” in the media and political forums, we must be aware this may come at a price. Indeed, COP21 itself seems to already be the testing ground.

After much debate, the most up to date draft for COP21 includes migration, in brackets, under the section on loss and damage. This means that migration, if it is to be part of the agenda at all, will be mainly addressed through issues of compensation and/or relocation. Thus, the emphasis this time around will be on a climate displacement facility. Such a step seems daunting in the face of existing politics and tensions over just who will foot the bill.  Perhaps a small sampling of this can be seen by the fact that Switzerland would prefer to leave the issue out of negotiations entirely.

The fact that there seems to be less of a focus in COP21 on migration being a means of adaptation is not a very promising sign and may undo some of the headway made by the 2010 Cancun Adaptation Framework, which had catalysed much of the research on “migration as adaptation.” Further still, there is a need to more systematically align climate and development policies, as aims such as poverty reduction, food security as well as effective governance structures dealing with climate change, are important aspects in the climate-migration nexus.

Nevertheless, policymakers must acknowledge that enhancing capacities to deal with climatic risks in source areas won’t automatically prevent people from migrating. We need to acknowledge, accept, and understand that migration is an integral aspect of global society.